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The Limits of Conceptual Analysis
in Aesthetics 
Karlheinz Lüdeking
abstract  In order to understand why analytic aesthetics has lost a lot of its 
former intellectual stature it is necessary to combine historical reconstruction 
with systematic consideration. In the middle of the twentieth century analytic 
philosophers came to the conclusion that essentialist theories of the “nature” 
of art are no longer tenable. As a consequence they felt compelled to move to 
the meta­level of conceptual analysis. Then they tried to show how a purely 
classificatory concept of art is used. The presupposition, however, that there 
actually is such a concept can only appear plausible at first sight. Upon closer 
inspection it turns out to be utterly misguided.
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Analytic aesthetics has, for quite some time, lost a lot of its original 
fascination. Art-lovers, especially aficionados of contemporary art, are 
nowadays usually drawn to books by Deleuze, Agamben and Rancière 
whereas others, especially those who prefer the art of the old masters, 
often abstain from reading any philosophical treatises at all in order to 
occupy themselves with studies in the history of art instead. Thus, if 
there is still an interest in aesthetics it is most likely focussed on theories 
conceived in the wake of “continental” thinkers like Bergson, Benjamin 
and even Schiller. Analytic aesthetics, by contrast, is widely considered 
to be pettifogging, boring and irrelevant. 
Such a low esteem, I think, has not emerged without reasons and, 
therefore, it would be foolish for analytic philosophers to deny that there 
are any shortcomings in analytic aesthetics. On the other hand such 
shortcomings need not necessarily be ascribed to the use of the methods 
of analytic philosophy as such. No one can seriously claim that an ana-
lytic approach to the problems of aesthetics must be misguided right 
from the start. It is, on the contrary, quite obvious that the methods of 
analytic philosophy proved to be very powerful in revealing the many 
weaknesses of traditional theories of art. Therefore, it certainly was a 
very beneficial achievement when the spirit of careful analytic clarifica-
tion finally reached even the remote area of aesthetics in the middle of 
the last century. It swept away a lot of murky speculation and barely 
concealed propaganda. Moreover, it gave rise to the long overdue insight 
that in aesthetics, just as in all other areas of philosophy,  it is no longer 
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possible to fix all of our attention directly on the phenomena themselves 
and that we must, instead, first get clear about the meaning and the use 
of the concepts through which we refer to these phenomena. 
At the same time, however, the pioneers of analytic aesthetics devel-
oped a certain fixed idea of how the analysis of the relevant concepts 
– and especially of the concept of art – must proceed, and it is this fixed 
idea, I want to show, that is responsible for most of the unsatisfactory 
results of analytic aesthetics. In this paper I can only try to prove this, 
though, with regard to the concept of art itself. Here the basic problem 
is that most analytic philosophers treated this concept – the concept of 
art – not as a value-concept but as an essentially classificatory concept 
whose primary function is to delineate a certain empirically definable 
class of artefacts. For reasons I will try to elucidate, this attempt seemed 
to be the only possible alternative to traditional theories that had become 
untrustworthy because they pretended to reveal the “real essence” of art 
but in effect were only more or less disguised attempts dogmatically to 
maintain a necessarily one-sided normative ideal of art. 
The conviction that the concept of art must be understood as a non-
normative concept thus arose in opposition to the normativity of tra-
ditional theories. It has, right from the start, shaped the enterprise of 
conceptual analysis in aesthetics and has dominated most of the various 
attempts to clarify the meaning or use of the concept of art. It is a fun-
damental starting point for nearly all the initial proponents of analytic 
aesthetics – notably Morris Weitz, William Kennick and George Dickie. 
It does not, however, play an important role in the writings of philos-
ophers like Nelson Goodman or Arthur Danto, who were not so much 
interested in the semantics of the concept of art than in art itself as a 
semantic phenomenon. It is no accident, then, that the work of these two 
philosophers is still widely read and discussed today whereas the others 
are more or less forgotten. 
Nevertheless, I think, it can be helpful to elucidate the reasons for 
the failure of their efforts. In order to understand why the conceptual 
approach to the philosophy of art was incapable of developing a con-
vincing alternative to traditional theories it is advisable to concentrate 
on the paradigmatic case of Morris Weitz who was one of the first and 
one of the most influential advocates of linguistic inquiries in aesthetics. 
His work is of special interest also because he is a renegade: He had to 
perform, in his own intellectual development, the very turn against the 
traditional way of thinking about art that became the hallmark of the 
whole school of which he was a leading figure.
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The “traditional” approach to the philosophy of art, against which the 
analytic rebels had to take their stand, is, first of all, closely related to 
our ordinary and spontaneous thinking about the subject which would 
suggest that there must be some specific peculiarities that distinguish 
artworks from other things. This is by no means an absurd idea: After 
all, it cannot be denied that, in practice, we constantly make distinctions 
between artworks and other things, and that we employ certain cri teria 
in doing so. Thus it must initially seem only reasonable to assume that 
there are specific properties by which we can distinguish artworks from 
everything else. In philosophy, this highly intuitive idea inspires the “es-
sentialist” program of inquiring into the “real essence” or “nature” of art 
which can be stated in a “real definition.” It is, thus, no surprise that 
Weitz himself initially considered it self-evident that the essentialist 
strategy of looking for the defining properties of art is the only possible 
way of doing philosophical aesthetics. In his 1950 book Philosophy of the 
Arts, he still asserts, without any trace of doubt, that his task is to search 
for “the definition of the nature of art,” and he actually proposes such a 
definition, claiming that the essential property of artworks is the com-
plex unity of their sensuous and expressive features.
Now it is very instructive to examine the reasons that led Weitz to the 
conclusion that a traditional theory of art (of which he had produced his 
own specimen) is ultimately untenable. We cannot, however, get clear 
about this matter if we take at face value the reasons Weitz himself gives 
in his seminal paper on “The Role of Theory in Aesthetics” (published in 
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism in 1956 and repeatedly reprint-
ed later). This paper would suggest that his most important reason for 
dismissing traditional theories was his recognition that they had been 
based on semantic confusions. He writes that it is the “logic of the con-
cept” that prevents us from laying down necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for the concept of art and thereby “to close” this concept, as he likes 
to say. His real reason, however, is a purely pragmatic one. This is openly 
admitted by Weitz himself in the following passage: “We can, of course, 
choose to close the concept. But to do this with ‘art’ ... is ludicrous since it 
forecloses on the very conditions of creativity in the arts.”1
An essentialist definition of the concept of art is, thus, in no way “logi-
cally” (or semantically) impossible, it is merely “ludicrous.” It has to be 
rejected only because of the practical consequences that, in his opinion, 
follow from it. There is one consequence in particular that Weitz is afraid 
of: Since a definition of the concept of art always has to tie its use, once 
and for all, to one particular condition or set of conditions, it would nec-
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essarily have the effect of excluding novel works of art exhibiting quali-
ties that nobody has ever dreamt of before. A “closed” concept could, 
thus, simply not remain faithful to the revolutionary development of 
modern art as it actually takes place. 
In order to confirm this point I beg the reader to imagine Weitz being 
invited to the opening of the permanent exhibition of the Arensberg Col-
lection (including a number of works by Marcel Duchamp) at the Phila-
delphia Museum of Art in 1954. There he would, for instance, have been 
confronted with a work from 1916 entitled Peigne en fer that consists of 
a small metal comb with an enigmatic French inscription: 3 ou 4 gouttes 
de hauteur n’ont rien a faire avec la sauvagerie. This work, as Weitz would 
probably have admitted, does certainly not strike its viewers by means 
of its “sensuous and expressive features” and their “organic composi-
tion into a unified whole” as it should do if the theory of art that Weitz 
had formulated only four years earlier was right. Nevertheless it was, by 
one of America’s most prestigious museums, exhibited as an artwork of 
undisputed significance. What could Weitz then, on this occasion, have 
done with his definition that he had taken such pains to elaborate? I 
think he would have had to face three equally unpalatable alternatives.
First, he could have admitted that he was simply wrong, since, obvi-
ously, there are works of art of generally acknowledged importance that 
do not display the quality he had taken to be their defining property. 
Weitz could thus have dropped his definition – though without realistic 
hope of finding a better one that would have avoided this fate. 
Secondly, he could have tried to expand his definition so that it event-
ually can include cases (like the one at hand) that it does not immediately 
fit. Pursuing this strategy, however, he would have progressively emptied 
his definition of all content. Of course, nothing would have prevented 
Weitz from insisting that even this unspectacular work by Duchamp 
that consists of an ordinary metal comb displays a certain organic unity 
of sensuous and expressive features. But that would have been a rather 
shallow move which does not really save his definition, because, even if 
that obscure assertion would have been granted, it would nonetheless 
have been doubtful whether it is actually this peculiar quality that makes 
Duchamp’s comb a work of art. 
In order to uphold his definition Weitz would thus have had to choose 
the third and last possibility: He would have had to claim that the strange 
work of Duchamp really does not fit his definition and that it, therefore, 
simply cannot be a work of art at all.
Initially someone committed to a certain definition of the “nature” of 
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Marcel Duchamp: Peigne en fer (1916). The Arensberg Collection, 
The Philadelphia Museum of Art. 
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art will most likely choose the last alternative since it does not imply 
concessions on the part of his theory. This alternative, however, is not 
only the most probable, but also the most pernicious. If a philosopher 
just drops his definition of art or expands it beyond recognition, he does 
not cause any harm, except perhaps to his own pride and reputation. But 
a stubborn insistence that certain unconventional artworks cannot be 
art at all may be more deleterious: It may have the effect of degrading 
and discouraging artists producing such vanguard products and, more 
seriously, it may bar all of us from important and substantial experiences 
that these novel works might have to offer. 
It is no surprise, then, that Weitz is primarily worried about this last 
possibility. He is very much aware of the potentially restrictive effects of 
a definition of the concept of art. And he is moved to criticise traditional 
theories because he is convinced that each of these theories is in constant 
danger of degenerating into a normative dogma which engenders an ar-
bitrary demarcation between art and non-art. This fate can, of course, be 
avoided if the criteria proposed by the theory are so weak or so vague that 
they cannot determine a clear-cut distinction anyway. But if the theory 
wants to state criteria that allow for such a distinction, it will inevitably 
have to pin down boundaries that in reality are not fixed. After all, it is an 
undeniable fact that the class of artworks is continuously able to include 
novel works that could not have been included before. Therefore, any 
workable and effective definition has the unpleasant effect that certain 
members of the class of artworks have to be excluded – although they 
have, by common consent, already gained a place in that class of things. 
If a theory, however, leads to such a deviation from the generally ac-
cepted distinction between art and non-art, it is clear that it does not 
reveal the criteria on which the actual classification of artworks is based. 
It does not describe the use of the concept of art as it actually takes place, 
it can only prescribe a certain use that is not generally accepted. Accord-
ingly, the criteria it states can only have a normative function: They lead 
to an arbitrary selection of things that are allowed to enter the privileged 
precincts of art. By adopting these criteria one is thus committed to a 
limited and necessarily one-sided view of art that is not (or no longer) 
shared by all the others who obviously apply the concept of art on the 
basis of different criteria in order to make different distinctions. 
Weitz was thus – and I think, quite correctly – led to the conclusion that 
the attempt of traditional philosophers to tie the concept of art to certain 
fixed conditions will always result in an arbitrarily restricted use of the 
concept that is in contradiction to the generally accepted classification of 
Karlheinz Lüdeking
106
artworks in our society. In his opinion, however, a philosophy of art must 
by all means avoid this effect. Weitz was convinced that the aesthetician 
has no right to set up a normative ideal of art and to force it upon the pub-
lic, because, as the history of aesthetics shows, this can only lead to theories 
that will, for ever, remain contested and precarious.
But how can a theory of art avoid sliding into such questionable nor-
mative statements? For Weitz it was clear that it does not ensure the 
neutrality of the theory if only it is elaborated in compliance with strictly 
empiricist standards. Even the most scrupulous search for peculiar prop-
erties of art based on the most careful and unbiased investigation will 
suffer the shameful fate of being – unintentionally – transformed into 
a restrictive norm at a certain point of time, namely when novel works 
of art are created that simply could not have been taken into account be-
fore. Thus, if even utmost sincerity and willingness to adapt one’s theory 
to the facts cannot save one from committing the sin of normativity, the 
only thing left is to switch to the meta-level of conceptual inquiry. And 
this conceptual inquiry, in turn, must itself of course be strictly neutral, 
because it was motivated precisely by the hope of avoiding any unjusti-
fied normative implications. 
Thus Weitz came to the conclusion that the only alternative to tradi-
tional theories is a completely non-normative approach located on the 
meta-level of conceptual inquiry. And this is actually still a plausible con-
viction. The fateful thing was that Weitz, right from the start, conflated a 
non-normative theory of the concept of art with a theory of a non-norma-
tive concept of art.
I will now advance some conjectures about the motives that may have 
led Weitz to this remarkable conflation, which was later mindlessly 
taken over by many other philosophers so that it eventually became an 
unquestioned dogma of analytic aesthetics. 
Most important in this respect is the fact that Weitz was primarily con-
cerned with the question how the extension of the concept of art is deter-
mined. This is quite understandable insofar as the basic problem for tra-
ditional theories was, indeed, that they were never able to get clear about 
the limits of the class of things they were talking about. Their necessar-
ily generalising propositions about common properties of all artworks 
failed again and again, because the class of things these generalisations 
were meant to cover was itself in constant flux. The basic problem, there-
fore, appeared to be the problem of determining how the classification 
of artworks takes place, because unless this problem is solved nothing 
reliable can be said about the things that belong to this class. 
The Limits of Conceptual Analysis in Aesthetics
107
Now, the fundamental observation of Weitz must have been that, in 
our society, there simply exists a certain class of objects that are actually 
treated as artworks, independently of the opinions or attitudes of any 
particular individual in this society. Everyone must then also designate 
these objects as artworks, no matter how their value may be appraised 
from any individual’s point of view. Thus, the question whether a given 
thing is actually a member in the class of artworks appears to be a simple 
matter of fact which is completely independent from any normative as-
sessment. Therefore, Weitz concluded, the task to pick out this class of 
things can only be accomplished by a purely empirical concept of art that 
is not based upon any normative standard. This led him to believe that 
there must be a purely descriptive or classificatory concept of art.
Other analytic philosophers shared this belief and so a number of 
different accounts of a purely descriptive concept of art were worked 
out. Basically there are four plausible variants of such accounts. Two of 
them regard the concept of art as a concept of ordinary language. On the 
one hand, we have here the theory of Morris Weitz himself, according to 
which the concept of art is a “family-resemblance-concept” with a flexible 
set of criteria. On the other hand, there is the theory of William Kennick 
who suggests that the use of the concept is analogous to that of percep-
tual concepts so that there is no need to make use of any criteria at all. 
The remaining two variants see the concept of art as a theoretical concept 
which is used on the basis of complex criteria – criteria that may well 
even be normative ones. These theories, however, assume that the mean-
ing of the concept is independent of the criteria that determine its appli-
cation to specific cases. Here we first have the theory of George Dickie: 
The concept of art designates objects with a certain status, so that the cri-
teria for acquiring this status are no longer relevant for the semantic con-
tent of the concept. And secondly we have the “rigid-designator-theory” 
as advocated, for instance, by James Carney. This theory also eliminates 
any semantic relevance of the (changing) criteria that different speakers 
use to discover what belongs to the extension of the concept. 
This is not the place to demonstrate at length why none of these the-
ories was able to give an informative account of the actual use of the 
concept of art.2 I only want to point out that it is a remarkable common 
feature of all these theories that they have the effect of detaching the 
meaning of the concept of art from any criteria strong enough to entail 
a genuine decision about any given cases. In order to avoid normative 
restrictions, each of these theories has to describe the use of the concept 
of art in a way that can no longer really tell us where the concept does or 
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does not apply. Such information should, however, be expected from a 
theory that claims to describe the use of a purely classificatory concept 
of art through which the empirical class of artworks is supposedly delin-
eated. These theories can therefore not even live up to their own claims.
This is no wonder, because what is at stake here is simply not ordinary 
classification. The membership in the class of artworks is not a plain 
matter of fact; rather, it depends entirely upon decisions about artisti-
cally valuable qualities of the objects in question. And therefore the ques-
tion whether or not to apply the concept of art in these cases cannot 
simply be settled by appeal to certain generally accepted criteria – as it 
would be the case with a purely descriptive or classificatory concept. The 
concept of art is primarily used as a value-concept. For it is a character-
istic peculiarity of value-concepts that their application to given cases is 
never determined by their generally accepted (linguistic) meaning or the 
conditions of their (linguistically correct) use.
I would like to demonstrate this by means of a simple example: Every-
one who is able to read this essay knows the meaning of the word “good” 
very well, but this knowledge alone does not suffice to determine whether 
this essay may or may not be called good. One can only answer this ques-
tion if one chooses (or has already chosen) criteria that constitute a nor-
mative conception of what is to count as a good philosophical paper. And 
since there can be different and contradictory opinions about this matter 
the criteria required for the application of “good” in such a case, obviously, 
cannot be determined by the generally accepted rules of language. 
In a similar way, someone – say any one of the above mentioned authors 
– who clearly knows (and is even an expert of) the meaning and use of 
the term “work of art,” is not, through this knowledge alone, enabled to 
determine, for instance, whether a simple metal comb with a French in-
scription may or may not be called a work of art. In order to decide this 
question it is necessary to make use of criteria that constitute a normative 
conception of what is to count as a work of art. And again there can be dif-
ferent and contradictory opinions about the matter. According to the cri-
teria of the early (“traditional”) Weitz the concept of art cannot apply, but 
it certainly may apply if we employ other criteria (like self-reflexivity or 
meaningfulness). And the choice of these criteria is again not determined 
by the generally accepted meaning of the concept of art. 
In a certain sense, however, the question whether the concept of art 
may be applied in such a case is indeed a question that is independent 
of any normative assessment. After all, it really is a plain matter of fact 
whether a given object is a member of the class of things actually treated 
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as artworks in our society or not. Accordingly, there must also be a purely 
descriptive use of the concept of art which simply states the member-
ship in this class. This is true. But, as the theory of Dickie reveals most 
clearly, this use of the concept can only be a derivative use that complete-
ly depends upon the fact that the membership in this class is already 
bestowed on the object in question. This membership itself, however, is 
only awarded to objects that satisfy certain normative standards.
Now it is possible to see the dilemma that is manifested in the unfor-
tunate antagonism that developed between traditional philosophers of 
art and their analytic adversaries.
Traditional philosophers, committed to the essentialist strategy, tried 
to tie the application of the concept of art to one particular criterion or 
a set of such criteria. And in a way they were quite justified in doing so, 
since the application of the concept to any specific case must indeed 
be based upon explicit criteria that enable a clear-cut decision about 
whether something is art or not. Traditional theories, however, never 
realised that such criteria can only be based on normative conceptions 
and that they can therefore not be presented as criteria that are simply 
determined by a given and unchangeable “nature” of art which is already 
out there waiting to be discovered. 
Analytic philosophers realised this, and they pointed out that the 
membership in the class of artworks is not determined by some eternal 
essence shared by the members of this class, but by distinctions made 
by society. But since these distinctions may change over time, they can 
obviously not be based upon one criterion that is fixed once and for all. 
Moreover, the fact that, at a given time, a certain class of things is classi-
fied as art does not prevent us from taking divergent evaluative attitudes 
to the members of this class. This shows that someone who uses the 
concept of art in accordance with the generally accepted rules of its use 
is not thereby forced to accept one particular normative criterion for its 
application.
As we have seen, however, the various attempts of analytic philosophers 
to show how the concept of art may be used without any commitment to 
normative criteria had so unsatisfactory results that they finally lost all 
credibility. Certainly, these philosophers were quite right in saying that 
the concept of art must have a generally accepted meaning compatible 
with different standards of value. But they were wrong in their conviction 
that the generally accepted meaning of the concept – which has to be em-
ployed by anyone, whatever his normative attitude in respect to different 
artworks may be – will by itself settle its application to particular cases. As 
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with “good,” the ascription of the concept of art to a given case is not pos-
sible without choosing normative criteria relevant to this case.
These criteria may change from case to case and from time to time, 
and different persons may use different criteria for the same case. There-
fore, the generally accepted meaning of the concept of art must indeed 
be independent from all these floating criteria. But this does not mean 
that we have to understand the actual use of this concept independently 
from these criteria. To the contrary, we have to realise that the concept of 
art could not even be used in one single case without the employment of 
one of these (divergent and changing) normative criteria.
But if the concept of art is basically a value-concept, how can we then 
explain the undeniable fact that there is a certain class of things that – no 
matter how we would judge their value – are, at a given time and in a 
certain society, generally accepted and designated as artworks? It is clear, 
after all that has been said, that the demarcation of this class of things 
cannot simply be the result of the uniform use of one and the same clas-
sificatory concept. In my view, rather, the class of artworks has to be 
understood as an unintended and unforeseeable overall result of all the 
divergent and conflicting applications of the concept of art by all the dif-
ferent speakers who all use different normative criteria. Thus, although 
each of the single ascriptions of the concept of art is based upon a nor-
mative distinction, the general outcome constitutes a simple empirical 
fact – the fact that a certain number of things are now actually accepted 
as the class of artworks. 
The existence of an empirically delimitable class of artworks, there-
fore, does not mean that there must also be a corresponding concept 
which serves the function of a purely empirical delimitation of that class. 
Rather, the existence of this class has proved to be entirely compatible 
with the fact that each particular distinction between art and non-art 
requires the employment of a normative criterion. And if the class of 
artworks is delimited by the combined effect of the whole number of 
competing normative distinctions between art and non-art, then the idea 
that the concept of art has to be treated as a descriptive and classificatory 
concept must be considered a myth.
We can now appreciate why the results of a purely conceptual ap-
proach to aesthetics had to be rather disappointing. In order to learn 
about the distinction between art and non-art, we must explore not our 
concept, but our conceptions of art. Conceptual analysis will never yield 
much insight if it is concerned with value-concepts. Therefore, the at-
tempt to do philosophy of art by inquiring into the generally accepted 
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meaning of the concept of art is not very productive. The results are thin, 
because there is little to discover.
But does the failure of both traditional as well as analytic approaches 
to the problem of the definition of art in the end mean that there is noth-
ing left to do for a philosophy of art? I do not think so. Of course, on 
the one hand it has become clear that it is an absurd ambition to reveal 
what art “really” is, because every theory about the “real nature” of art 
will sooner or later be unmasked as a normative dogma. On the other 
hand, it has proved to be equally absurd to turn to the rules of language 
in order to learn what art is. However, realising this, we are only released 
from constraints. Our understanding of art is no longer restricted by 
the strange fiction that art is a phenomenon whose peculiarities are de-
termined independently of us – either by the nature of things or by the 
rules of language. Once we overcome this delusion, we gain the freedom 
to reflect upon the only aspect of art that is really important to us. We see 
that art cannot be understood as independent of the divergent ways in 
which we are able to conceive of its many merits.
What we have to do, then, is this: First we must clarify the normative 
conceptions of art that we have – more or less unconsciously – inherited 
and adopted, and then we have to consider whether we have good rea-
sons to stick with them, or whether we should go beyond them towards 
something new. This sounds trivial and it is trivial. It is, thus, all the more 
surprising that such a banality could have been neglected for so long by an 
entire school of aesthetics. In practice, however, most persons interested 
in art have already done the only reasonable thing all along. Someone who 
is seriously interested in art simply cannot help to reflect upon his concep-
tion of art in light of its social and historical conditions. Probably some of 
the readers will feel that such a self-reflective approach to aesthetics is not 
really “philosophy” any more, but only art criticism. But, whatever it may 
be called, I am convinced that this is the only way to understand what art is 
– which, in the end, is also a way of understanding what we are ourselves.
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